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The EU’s emissions trading system employs a ‘cap and trade’ framework under which a ‘cap’ on
the level of greenhouse gas emissions is set, with allowances for emissions becoming tradable
between business and other actors. Since the ﬁnancial crisis, however, a surplus of emission
allowances has built up, undermining the eﬀectiveness of the system. Luca Taschini writes on a
recent proposal, approved in the European Parliament on 8 July, to tackle this problem by creating
a so called ‘Market Stability Reserve’. He argues that while this should be seen as a positive
development, its impact will depend heavily on the details of the reform that are eventually agreed
between national governments.
This month has seen two major announcements for the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The
European Parliament approved, on 8 July, the introduction of a Market Stability Reserve (MSR). And, on 15 July, the
European Commission announced its ‘summer package’ for energy, which included proposed reforms to the number
of free emissions allowances companies are eligible for.
As it stands, the supply of allowances in the EU ETS is determined within a rigid allocation programme. A reform of
the EU ETS intends to make the allocation of allowances ﬂexible so that it can adapt to changes, such economic
shocks and technological advancements. The challenge for policymakers is to design a ﬂexible system that helps
regulate a market aﬀected by future uncertainty, whilst also limiting the complexity of that system.
I have previously argued in favour of a reform of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) that
makes the system more responsive to unexpected price shocks. A policy paper last year proposed a rules based
mechanism for withdrawing and injecting allowances from the market based on price trends.
So the vote in favour of an MSR by the European Parliament should be welcomed. However, it still needs to be
approved by EU environment ministers on 18 September and the exact details will no doubt be the subject of great
debate. But this is an attempt to ﬁx the root cause of the problems with the system: the rigid allowance allocation
programme.
As outlined in a policy paper, I have found that only long-term structural reforms – such as the introduction of an
MSR – can incorporate the ﬂexibility required by the EU ETS. This will allow the EU ETS to respond to economic
shocks. When the number of unused emissions permits in the system grows too large, the MSR means they can be
removed automatically. If there are too few permits in the system, more can be added automatically.
The strength of the proposed MSR is that it is a rules-based market mechanism. The exact design of the mechanism
is yet to be decided. Crucially, there are four parameters to be decided on: ﬁrst, the point at which the system
contains ‘too many’ permits; second, the point at which the system contains ‘too few’ permits; third, the rate at which
new permits are added to the system; and fourth, the rate at which permits are removed from the system.
Setting the levels of ‘too many’ or ‘too few’ permits is likely to prove controversial. Green industries and green
campaigners will call for fewer permits in the system. And those on the other side of the argument will want more
permits in the system. All parties are likely to be left feeling dissatisﬁed. This could prove a signiﬁcant political barrier
to agreeing an eﬀective MSR mechanism.
Environment ministers in the European Commission would be better placed focussing on just one number: a single
1/2
Credit: Chrishna (CC-BY-SA-3.0)
rate at which permits are added to and removed from
the system. A single rate would eﬀectively create a
quantity corridor with an implied upper limit and an
implied lower limit. The higher the rate at which
permits are added to or removed from the system,
the more controlled the quantity of unused permits in
the system will become. A higher rate leads to a
narrower quantity corridor.
A more controlled quantity of permits also makes the
system more resilient to shocks – it stabilises the
system. Hence Market Stability Reserve. However, a
highly controlled quantity of permits increases
micromanagement and undermines the fact that the
EU ETS is a market-based mechanism. There is
therefore a trade-oﬀ to be had.
Our analysis investigates this trade oﬀ and proposes
a tool for the selection of an optimal adjustment rate.
Based on the modelling assumptions, the resulting rate at which permits are added to and removed from the system
does not seem to be far from the adjustment rate indicated by the European Commission.
When all is considered, the European Commission’s suggestion of 12 per cent of permits in the system per annum
looks to be in the right ballpark. It is also positive that the European Parliament has brought forward the date at
which it introduces the MSR to 2019, two years earlier than initially suggested. Our research has previously
recommended that the MSR should be introduced as soon as it possibly can.
The Commission must now ensure that debates over the exact design of the MSR do not come at the detriment of
an eﬀective emissions trading system. After all, the main goal is to create an incentive that begins to decarbonise
the European economy.
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